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Abstract—The effective deployment of unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) systems and services hinges on securing them against cyber-
physical attacks that can jeopardize their mission or use them to
intrude into secured perimeters. In this paper, a novel mathematical
framework is introduced for modeling and analyzing the cyber-
physical security of time-critical UAV applications. A general
UAV security network interdiction game is formulated to model
interactions between a UAV operator and an interdictor, each of
which can be benign or malicious. In this game, the interdictor
chooses the optimal location(s) from which to target the drone
system by interdicting the potential paths of the UAVs. Meanwhile,
the UAV operator responds by finding an optimal path selection
policy that enables its UAVs to evade attacks and minimize their
mission completion time. New notions from cumulative prospect
theory (PT) are incorporated into the game to capture the operator’s
and interdictor’s subjective valuations of mission completion times
and perceptions of the risk levels facing the UAVs. The equilibrium
of the game, with and without PT, is then analytically characterized
and studied. Novel algorithms are then proposed to reach the game’s
equilibria under both PT and classical game theory. Simulation
results show the properties of the equilibrium for both the rational
and PT cases. The results show that the operator’s and interdictor’s
bounded rationality is more likely to be disadvantageous to the
UAV operator. In particular, the more distorted the perceptions and
valuations of the operator are, the higher is its achieved expected
mission completion time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) tech-
nology have led to its adoption in various commercial, recre-
ational, and military applications such as telecommunications,
surveillance, delivery systems, rescue operations, and intelli-
gence missions [1]–[6]. Due to their ability to reach relatively
inaccessible locations (such as natural disaster sites as well as
remote mountains, valleys, and forests) and their capacity to
travel without being restricted to predefined pathways, UAVs can
effectively carry out time-critical missions [1], [7]–[9].
A. Time Critical UAV Applications and Security Challenges
One prominent time-critical UAV application is drone deliv-
ery systems [6]–[15] which can be used to deliver consumer
parcels [6], [10]–[12] (with Amazon Prime Air [10] and Google’s
Project Wing [6] being key examples) as well as emergency
medical products [7]–[9].
However, the practical deployment of drone delivery systems
can be hindered by their vulnerability to a myriad of cyber and
physical attacks [16]–[22]. On the physical side, to avoid conflict
with manned and commercial aviations, the altitude of UAVs is
typically limited to around 400 ft [23], putting them in the range
of hunting rifles and firearms. Moreover, UAVs are vulnerable to
a variety of cyber threats as demonstrated in [16]–[22]. For exam-
ple, the work in [16] provided a general overview of cyber attacks
which can target the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
UAV systems. The authors in [17] focused on the security of
the communication links between ground control and unmanned
aircrafts. Moreover, the authors in [18] successfully launched
a man-in-the-middle attack against a typical UAV used by law
enforcement agencies for critical applications. Meanwhile, the
authors in [19] and [20] investigated GPS spoofing attacks to
manipulate the trajectory of an autonomous UAV while the work
in [21] considered jamming, spoofing, and eavesdropping attacks
which can target UAV systems. In addition, the authors in [22]
surveyed various detection and localization techniques as well
as cyber-physical attacks which can be used against UAVs.
On the other hand, the ability of drones to reach secure or
private locations has raised concerns regarding their possible
usage for executing malicious missions, with recent real-world
incidents at Gatwick airport in the UK [23]. For instance, a
number of recent works, such as [22] and [24], studied the risks
of potentially using UAVs to execute nefarious missions such
as targeting a public, political, or military figure in a secure
perimeter, intruding into a military secure perimeter, smuggling
illicit products, or gaining unauthorized access to personal prop-
erty. This has led to the development of what is known as anti-
drone systems whose goal is to defend against intruding drones as
discussed in [22] and [24]. The interactions between intruding
drones and anti-drone systems is clearly another highly time-
critical application of UAVs, beyond delivery systems.
Security analyses of these two time-critical UAV applications
involve: a) a UAV aiming to achieve a mission (benign or
malicious) in the shortest possible time and b) an interdictor
(malicious, e.g., in drone delivery systems, or benign, e.g., in
anti-drone systems) whose goal is to interdict and delay the UAV
and compromise its mission. The highly intertwined decision
making processes of these two scenarios motivate the need for
a holistic strategic analysis which can capture this underlying
interdependent decision making processes and identify optimal
interdiction and security strategies. However, beyond our pre-
liminary work in [25] on the security of drone delivery systems,
which was limited to a static analysis1, prior art [16]–[22],
[24], and references therein, have somewhat remarkably ignored
such interactive time-critical situations and, instead, have either
provided qualitative analyses or focused on specific and isolated
security experiments, rather than on a comprehensive study.
B. Summary of Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is to develop the first
comprehensive framework for the modeling and analysis of the
cyber-physical security of time-critical UAV applications. We
1Our current work advances and generalizes our preliminary results presented
in [25]. Our preliminary work [25] considered a static environment while the
current work treats a general setting in which the UAV performs a repeated path
selection decision making aiming at minimizing a cumulative mission completion
time.
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pose the general problem as a network interdiction game with
a leader-follower structure between an interdictor (malicious
or benign) and a UAV operator (benign or malicious). In this
game, the interdictor (i.e. the leader) chooses the optimal attack
locations along the area which can be traversed by the UAV
to interdict the UAV, via a cyber or physical attack, with the
goal of delaying the UAV and compromising its mission. On
the other hand, the UAV (i.e. the follower) acts as an evader
that chooses the best path selection policy from its origin to
its destination, while evading attacks and minimizing its total
expected travel time (hereinafter called the expected delivery
time) needed to complete the mission. We consider both de-
terministic and probabilistic interdiction strategies. First, with
deterministic interdiction strategies, we derive and analyze the
Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the game. We then show that a
probabilistic interdiction strategy gives rise to a game structure
in which the UAV’s problem corresponds to finding an optimal
policy in a Markov decision process (MDP) and the interdictor’s
problem corresponds to setting the parameters of this MDP. In
this regard, we characterize the SE of the game with mixed
interdiction strategies, and propose practical algorithms to solve
the underlying UAV operator’s and interdictor’s problems.
The aforementioned analysis captures the decision making
processes of the agents considering that they are fully rational,
i.e., they assess delivery times and perceive risk levels objec-
tively. In order to capture wider practical application settings,
our work also considers the interdictor’s and UAV operator’s
potential subjectivity, i.e. bounded rationality. For instance, time-
critical UAV applications aim at strictly accomplishing a mission
within a target delivery time as delays in such applications
can have tragic consequences. Given this time criticality, the
merit of an achieved delivery time can be valued relative to
the target delivery time, rather than as an absolute quantity, and
this valuation can be performed subjectively and differently by
the UAV operator and the interdictor. In addition, the choices
of interdiction and path selection strategies are influenced by
various underlying uncertainties which stem, for example, from
the probabilistic risk levels of a certain path and the likelihood
with which a carried out cyber-physical attack is successful.
Hence, due to these uncertainties, the likelihood of achieving
a certain delivery time can be perceived and assessed differently
by the interdictor and the UAV operator2. Classical game theory
does not capture such subjective valuations and perceptions
as it assumes full rationality of the players, which for our
game implies that both players assess delivery times and their
probability of occurrence objectively and similarly. Thus, to
capture these bounded rationality factors in our game, we extend
our analysis by using tools from cumulative prospect theory3
(PT) [26]. In this respect, we consider both deterministic and
probabilistic strategies in the PT game analysis. We derive
closed-from analytical expressions of the PT valuations of the
interdictor and the UAV operator, and prove their convergence.
2The subjective valuation of outcomes and distorted perception of probabilities
in decision making under risk have been repeatedly observed and quantified in
various empirical analyses such as in [26] and [27].
3Cumulative prospect theory [26] provides a refinement and generalization of
traditional prospect theory [27]–[32] allowing it to accommodate a large number
of outcomes as needed in this work.
Then, we analytically derive the SE of the deterministic PT game,
and also propose solution algorithms that deliver numerically the
SE of the PT game with mixed interdiction strategies.
Finally, we complement our theoretical analysis with extensive
simulations. Our simulation results provide several key insights
into the effects of the incorporation of PT in our game formula-
tion on the resulting equilibrium strategies and achieved expected
delivery times:
• With an increase in the target delivery time, the interdictor is
more prone to choosing risk seeking interdiction strategies
while the UAV operator is less prone to taking risky paths.
• For a relatively high target delivery time, the PT valuations
and perceptions of the players lead to longer expected
delivery times as compared to the fully rational case.
• A more distorted perception of probabilities leads the UAV
to choosing risky paths, resulting in delays in expected
delivery time.
• The PT bounded rationality of the player is in general
disadvantageous to the UAV operator, leading to expected
delivery times which exceed the pre-set target delivery
times. This highlights the need for proper PT game model-
ing when specifying a target delivery time in time-critical
UAV applications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model and formulates the proposed network
interdiction game with fully rational players. Section III and
Section IV study the game under deterministic and probabilistic
interdiction strategies, respectively. Section V introduces and
studies the PT game considering deterministic and mixed inter-
diction strategies. Numerical results are presented in Section VI
and conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Consider a drone system in which a UAV, controlled by an
operator, executes a time-critical mission requiring it to travel
from a source location O to a destination location D in minimum
time, referred to as the delivery time. Meanwhile, an interdictor
seeks to interdict the UAV’s flight by choosing a certain area
or location, among a number of “danger points” along its path
from O to D, to launch a cyber-physical attack. The interdictor’s
attacks [16]–[19], [22] include physical attacks against the UAV
(such as using rifles or a military defense system) as well as
cyber attacks (such as de-authentication or GPS spoofing attacks)
which cause the UAV operator to lose control of the drone. Our
model readily captures two time-critical UAV use cases: a) The
drone delivery system case in which the UAV is a benign player
and the interdictor is malicious, and b) the anti-drone scenario
in which the interdictor is an anti-drone system seeking to stop
a rogue (or malicious) drone from reaching its destination.
A danger point represents a location (or area) along the
possible paths between O and D, from which the UAV is exposed
to possible cyber-physical attacks. Such points can represent
locations of high altitude, which allow line-of-sight and spatial
proximity (e.g., high hills, high-rise buildings, etc.) between a
potential attacker and the UAV. As a result, the set of danger
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a security graph with 10 danger points.
points between O and D correspond to inevitable locations
along the drone’s flight paths that are susceptible to attacks by a
malicious interdictor or an anti-drone system. The set of danger
points between O and D define a security network represented
by a directed graph G(N , E), as shown in Fig. 1, in which the
set of vertices, N , is the set of N danger points between O
and D, and the set of edges, E , such that |E| = E, is the set of
connections between these danger points. Given that, in practice,
the UAV’s travel from origin to destination may not be restricted
to predefined airways4, there can be an infinite number of paths
which connect O to D. However, each one of these paths will
go through a number of danger points that may be shared among
different paths. This infinite set of possible O to D paths can,
from a security viewpoint, be represented by the set of danger
points that each path traverses. Given the time-critical nature of
the considered UAV applications, the defined set of edges E in
the security graph G will comprise the shortest paths between
each two danger points.
For two neighboring points i and j connected by edge ek ∈ E ,
we let t(i, j), t(.): E → R, be the time that the UAV needs to
travel from i to j over ek. We let pn be the probability with which
an attack launched from point n ∈ N is successful. Without loss
of generality, we consider that for any n ∈ N \{O,D}, pn 6= 0;
and for n′ ∈ {O,D}, pn′ = 0. We define H to be the set of H
paths (containing no repeated vertices5) from the origin, O, to
destination, D, over the security graph G. For each path6 h ∈ H,
we define a distance function fh(.) : h → R, which takes an
input node n ∈ h and returns the time needed by the UAV to
reach n ∈ h from O following path h ∈ H. For example, in
Fig. 1, fh
′
(5) = t2 + t6 where h′ , (1, 3, 5, 8, 10).
On this security graph G, the interdictor aims at finding the
best interdiction strategy (a choice of danger points from which
to launch an attack) to intercept/delay the travel of the UAV
while the UAV acts as an evader who aims at finding the best
travel policy, and as a result a path selection strategy, to reach
D from O in a minimum delivery time.
B. Game-Theoretic Problem Formulation
The UAV operator, denoted by player U , must find the best
possible path for the UAV to take over graph G to reach D
from O in minimum time while accounting for the presence
of the interdictor (player I). In case the UAV is successfully
4Here, our model can also accommodate future scenarios in which the UAV’s
flight may be regulated and, as a result, restricted to a prescribed set of paths.
5Cycles are naturally dismissed by a UAV operator aiming at minimizing
delivery time.
6An O-to-D path h ∈ H is represented by its sequence of nodes connecting
O to D. Hence, we use the notation n ∈ h to represent a node n that is in h.
compromised by the interdictor from a node n ∈ N , U will
have to resend a new UAV with the same mission from node O,
which leads to both financial losses and delayed delivery time.
Hence, a successful attack by I at node n can be mathematically
modeled as if the UAV had returned to the point of origin from
which it needs to travel again to its destination. Hence, with the
goal of minimizing delivery time, U may not always choose the
shortest O-to-D path if this path is suspected to be risky. As such,
the path selection strategy must account for possible interdiction
strategies so as to successfully accomplish the O-to-D mission
in a minimum delivery time. Similarly, the interdiction strategy
must anticipate the possible paths that may be taken by the UAV
to maximize this delivery time. To model and analyze these
intertwined decision making processes of the interdictor and the
UAV operator, we next introduce a novel time-critical network
interdiction game.
In this game, the set of players is P , {U, I}. I chooses first
an interdiction strategy x ∈ X which is a probability distribution
over the set of danger points, N , where xn (i.e. element n of
vector x) specifies the probability with which to launch an attack
from node n ∈ N while satisfying ∑n∈N xn = 1. We refer to
this probabilistic choice of x as a mixed interdiction strategy. A
special case of x consists of restricting x to pure interdiction
strategies in which case xn = 1 for some n = m ∈ N and
xn = 0 for n ∈ N \ m. Based on the interdiction strategy x,
U chooses a travel policy (i.e. a path selection strategy), which
specifies the node n′ ∈ Ng(n) to go to from each possible node
n ∈ N , where Ng(n) is the set of outgoing neighbor nodes
of n in graph G. Such a policy will result in a certain O-to-
D path. Hence, the goal of I is to choose the best interdiction
strategy x, while anticipating the path selection policy that could
be taken by U , to maximize the expected delivery time while
the goal of U is to respond to x by choosing the best possible
path h ∈ H to minimize the expected delivery time. This gives
rise to a leader-follower (with I as the leader and U as the
follower) hierarchical time-critical network interdiction game.
We next separately study the games under pure interdiction and
mixed interdiction strategies.
III. GAME UNDER PURE INTERDICTION STRATEGIES
A. Game Formulation under Pure Strategies
Under pure strategies, I chooses to be located at node n (the
action space of I is, hence, N ) while the UAV seeks to choose an
O-to-D path h ∈ H. If h ∈ H contains node n, when traveling
from O-to-D along path h, it will traverse all danger points n′ ∈
h, n′ 6= n without any risk of being attacked. However, when
the UAV reaches n, it may continue its path with probability
1−pn, i.e., the probability with which the attack launched from
n is not successful, or it may be sent back to O with probability
pn, i.e., the probability with which the attack launched from n
is successful. Let ta be the re-handling time, which is the time
needed by the operator to send a new UAV, if the original one
was compromised. Then, the possible delivery times which can
occur when n ∈ h and their probability of occurrence will be:
Tk = f
h(D) + k[fh(n) + ta], (1)
τk = (1− qn)kqn = pknqn, (2)
for k ∈ N0; where qn = 1− pn, Tk is the kth possible delivery
time, and τk is the probability of occurrence of Tk. Hence,
based on the possible delivery times and their likelihood, defined
respectively in (1) and (2), the expected delivery time, Ed(n, h),7
when the interdictor is located at n and the UAV takes path h
is given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The expected delivery time for an interdiction
and path selection strategy pair, (n, h), is given by:
Ed(n, h) =
 f
h(D), if n /∈ h, (3)
pn
1− pn (f
h(n) + ta) + f
h(D), if n ∈ h. (4)
Proof: First, we consider the case in which n /∈ h. If
the chosen path h does not contain n, then the UAV cannot
be successfully attacked, which yields Ed(n /∈ h) = fh(D).
Second, we consider the case in which h contains node n,
i.e. n ∈ h. From (1), one can see that fh(D) appears in
every possible delivery time outcome, while (fh(n) + ta)
is multiplied by the number of times the UAV had been
successfully attacked at n before it was successfully able to
traverse n. This latter component of (1) corresponds to the
number of failures that the UAV experiences before the first
success in traversing n. Consider being successfully attacked
at n to be a failure of the UAV in traversing n, which can
occur with probability pn, and consider traversing n to be
a success for the UAV, which can occur with probability
qn = 1 − pn; then, the expected delivery time will be: Ed(n ∈
h)=(expected # failures before 1st success)(fh(n)+ta)+fh(D).
The number of failures before the first success follows a geo-
metric distribution whose mean is given by µ = 1−qnqn =
pn
1−pn .
As a result, Ed(n ∈ h)= pn1−pn (fh(n) + ta) + fh(D).
Hence, the pn1−pn (f
h(n) + ta) term in (4) can be viewed as
a delay penalty, which the UAV would endure for taking the
risk of traversing a risky danger point at which the interdictor is
located. The goal of the interdictor is to maximize this expected
delivery time while the goal of the UAV operator is to minimize
it, leading to a zero-sum game.
B. Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
For each choice n ∈ N by the interdictor, U can identify
the optimal reaction strategy h = ρ(n) specifying the best
path to take when I chooses n. The equilibrium concept of
this hierarchical game structure is known as the Stackelberg
equilibrium [33] and is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A strategy pair (n∗, h∗) constitutes a Stackelberg
equilibrium of the network interdiciton game if
Ed(n
∗, h∗ = ρ(n∗)) ≥ Ed(n, ρ(n)) ∀n ∈ N , and (5)
ρ(n) = argmin
h∈H
Ed(n, h), (6)
where Ed(n, h) is as given in (3) and (4).
Denoting a shortest O-to-D path by hs and a shortest O-to-
D path not containing a node n by hn, the SE of our network
interdiction game can be analytically characterized.
Theorem 1: The interdictor’s SE strategy, n∗, is given by:
7We also use the notations Ed(n ∈ h) and Ed(n /∈ h) to highlight whether
or not path h contains node n in the computed expected delivery time.
n∗ = argmax
n∈{n1,n2}
(
Ed
(
n1, ρ(n1)
)
, Ed
(
n2, ρ(n2)
))
, (7)
where
n1 = argmax
n∈Nhs
pn
1− pn (f
hs(n) + ta) + f
hs(D), (8)
n2 = argmax
n∈hs\Nhs
fhn(D), and (9)
Nhs = {n ∈ hs|
pn
1− pn (f
hs(n) + ta) + f
hs(D) ≤ fhn(D)}.
(10)
The UAV operator’s SE strategy is given by
h∗=ρ(n∗)=
{
hs, if n∗ = n1; (11)
hn2 , if n
∗ = n2. (12)
In addition, the resulting SE expected delivery time is
Ed(n
∗, h∗)=

pn∗
1− pn∗ (f
hs(n∗) + ta) + fhs(D),
if n∗ = n1; (13)
fhn2 (D), if n∗ = n2. (14)
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A.
The SE8 highlights that, from a delivery time perspective,
selecting the shortest path, even if it contains the node at which
the interdictor will be located, may still be the optimal path
since it may result in an expected delivery time that is lower
than all other alternative paths. This can occur, in particular, if
the shortest path length, fhs(D), is significantly shorter than the
possible alternatives; as captured by Nhs in (10).
Next, we analyze the case in which the interdictor chooses a
mixed interdiction strategy.
IV. GAME UNDER MIXED INTERDICTION STRATEGIES
A. Game Formulation with Mixed-Strategy Interdiction
We now analyze the time-critical network interdiction game
under a more general probabilistic choice of interdiction9. Here,
the interdictor may prefer to choose a probabilistic (i.e. mixed)
interdiction strategy to possibly prevent U from predicting their
exact actions and, hence, potentially achieving a better outcome.
In this case, I’s mixed-strategy vector, x = [x1, x2, ..., xN ] ∈ X
specifies the probability with which I plans to launch an attack
on the UAV from the nodes in N . Next, we show that when I
chooses a mixed interdiction strategy x, U ’s choice of optimal
path becomes an MDP problem whose transition probabilities
result from the choice x by I .
Consider the case in which I had chosen strategy x ∈ X and
the UAV was at node n, at time t0, and then decides to go to a
neighboring node j ∈ Ng(n). As such, U reaches node j at time
t0 + t(i, j), at which point it could be subject to an attack. The
probability with which the UAV is successfully attacked at node
j is equal to xjpj . As a result, if the UAV has reached node i at
time t0 and then decided to go to node j next, it can either reach
8The SE of the game is not necessarily unique. This can be observed, for
example, by considering a case in which the shortest O-to-D path is not unique.
However, given the hierarchical structure of the game [33], all possible SEs will
lead to an equal expected delivery time. This equally applies to the equilibria
which we will derive for the games that ensue.
9Given the hierarchical structure of our game, considering mixed path selection
policies by U would not yield any advantage regarding the achieved expected
delivery time as compared to the optimal deterministic path selection policy [33],
[34]. Thus, we limit our analysis to deterministic path selection.
node j at time t0 + t(i, j) and not be successfully attacked at j
(with probability 1−xjpj), or it can be brought back to the origin
when reaching node j (if subject to a successful attack) with
probability xjpj . This latter case implies that the UAV would
reach node O at time t0 + t(i, j) + ta with probability xjpj .
This security problem can then be modeled as an MDP [34]
whose transition probabilities depend on the security graph, G,
and on the choice x of I . We define the set of states of this MDP
to be the set of nodes N of G. U can then decide to go from a
node n to any of its neighboring nodes (i.e. next potential states).
However, its transition to this state is stochastic because, if the
attack is successful, instead of transitioning to a neighboring
node, the UAV transitions to state O.
The state transition probabilities, M
(
i, j; (x, k)
)
, specify the
probability of transitioning from state i to state j when I chooses
strategy x and U chooses action k when at i (choosing action
k refers to choosing to move from node i to node k ∈ Ng(i)).
M
(
i, j; (x, k)
)
is defined as:
M
(
i, j; (x, k)
)
=

(1− xkpk), for j = k, (15)
xkpk, for j = O, (16)
0, for j ∈ N \ {O, k}. (17)
The instantaneous cost to U (reward to I) from a state
transition from i to j, when I chooses x and U chooses to
move to node k, can be expressed as follows:
r
(
i, j;
(
x, k ∈ Ng(i)
))
=
{
t(i, k), for j = k, (18)
t(i, k) + ta, for j = O. (19)
For every transition between two states, the UAV accumulates
additional delivery time as expressed in (18) and (19), until the
UAV reaches D and the game ends. The goal of U is hence
to minimize this expected cumulative delivery time. Therefore,
the choice of a mixed strategy by the interdictor, x, defines an
MDP10 with transition probabilities as defined in (15)-(17) and
instantaneous reward/cost structure as shown in (18) and (19).
The goal of U is to choose the best MDP policy to minimize its
expected accumulated delivery time, where a policy pix specifies,
for each node n ∈ N \ {D}, the next node n′ ∈ Ng(s) to
which to go. We let P be the set of all policies. We note that,
given the state transitions in (15)-(17), a policy pix practically
results in one realizable O-to-D path denoted by hpix . This is
due to the fact that under the MDP policy pix, only the nodes
of a certain path will ever be reached. Hence, a policy reduces
to a path selection strategy. Given the equivalence between a
policy pix and its resulting O-to-D path hpix , we next use the two
notations interchangeably depending on whether the emphasis is
on a general policy pix or on its resulting path hpix .
We define Epix(s;x) to be the value of the state s when U
follows policy pix for the MDP induced by the mixed strategy, x,
of player I . In other words, Epix(s;x) is the expected time that
the UAV needs to reach D from s when policy pix is followed.
Based on (15)-(19), we can express the values of the states, for
a given policy pix, recursively; as follows:
Epix (s;x)=
∑
s′∈{pix(s),O}
M
(
s, s′;
(
x, pix(s)
))[
r
(
s, s′; (x, pix(s))
)
+Epix (s
′;x)
]
.
10Hence, hereinafter, we refer to this MDP as the MDP induced by x.
As such, the values of each two consecutive nodes, ni and nj
(nj being reached from ni based on pix), are such that:
Epix(ni;x) =(1− xnjpnj )
(
t(ni, nj) + Epix(nj ;x)
)
+ xnjpnj
(
t(ni, nj) + ta + Epix(O;x)
)
. (20)
Of particular interest to our analysis is the value at the origin,
Epix(O;x), which constitutes the expected delivery time when
following policy pix. For a given choice x by I , the goal of U
is to find a policy pi∗x which minimizes Epix(O;x). The optimal
values, Epi∗x(s;x), at each state s – i.e. the minimum expected
time for the UAV to reach D from s – are interdependent in a
recursive manner following from the Bellman equation:
Epi∗x(s;x)= mink∈Ng(s)
∑
s′∈{k,O}
M
(
s, s′; (x, k)
)
[r
(
s, s′; (x, k)
)
+Epi∗x(s
′;x)].
Based on the recursive definition in (20), the value at the
origin for an interdiction strategy x and an MDP policy pix,
inducing a path hpix=( O, n1, n2, n3, ..., nr, nl, nk, nm,
D) containing m + 2 nodes with ordered indices, is given in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: The value at the origin, Epix(O;x), for a mixed
interdiction strategy x and MDP policy pix, inducing path hpix =
(O,n1, n2, n3, ..., nr, nl, nk, nm, D), is given by:
Epix(O;x)=t(nm, D)+
1
1−xDpD
[
g(nk, nm, nD)
+
1
1−xnmpnm
(
g(nl, nk, nm)+...+
1
1−xn3pn3
(
g(n1, n2, n3)
+
1
1−xn2pn2
(
g(O,n1, n2)+
1
1−xn1pn1
g(O,n1)
))
...
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
m brackets
, (21)
where g(.) is a function which takes either 2 or 3 inputs (2
or 3 consecutive nodes of a path hpix , respectively) and which
we define as g(k,m, n)= xnpn(t(m,n) + ta)+t(k,m), and
g(m,n)= xnpn(t(m,n)+ta), considering k, m, and n to be
three consecutive nodes of a path hpix
Proof: The proof follows directly from (20) and from the
fact that Epix(D;x) = 0 for any possible policy, since the
expected delivery time starting from D is equal to 0. Details
are omitted due to space limitations.
To solve the game, we define the SE with mixed-strategy
interdiction11:
Definition 2: A strategy pair (x∗, pi∗x∗) constitutes a mixed
interdiction Stackelberg equilibrium (MSE) of the network in-
terdiction game if
x∗ = argmax
x∈X
Epi∗x(O;x), where (22)
pi∗x = argmin
pix∈P
Epix(O;x). (23)
This MSE can be also equivalently defined in terms of x∗ and
the optimal path induced by pi∗x∗ , i.e., (x
∗, h∗ = hpi∗
x∗ ).
11The MSE in Definition 2 is a saddle point of our underlying zero-sum game.
An alternative approach for studying the equilibrium of the zero-sum game is
to identify its corresponding saddle point in mixed strategies (i.e. considering
mixed strategies for both players), where these saddle-point mixed strategies can
be computed by solving a linear program [33]. However, the MSE in Definition 2
is tailored to the structure of our game, introduced in Section II, and does not
follow a brute-force approach.
B. Game Equilibrium under Mixed-Strategy Interdiction
U ’s problem consists of computing the optimal policy (or
optimal path) for the MDP induced by x. This can be achieved
using known methods such as value iteration and policy iteration
methods [34]. Indeed, for obtaining the values at each state (i.e.
node) resulting from a policy pix (known as policy evaluation),
Epix(O;x) can be computed as shown in (21) and then used to
find Epix(s;x) for each s ∈ S by starting from D (whose value
is Epix(D;x) = 0) and moving backwards while applying (20).
As such, using policy iteration [34], starting from a certain MDP
policy, policy evaluation and policy improvement steps can be
sequentially taken to converge to the optimal policy.
In their traditional form, value and policy iteration methods
seek to find an optimal policy specifying the best action to take
from every state in the state space. However, as stated in our
game formulation, a certain policy leads to a unique resulting
O-to-D path resulting in a certain value at the origin as shown
in (21). Next, we propose an alternative method for identifying
U ’s problem solution which does not seek to find the optimal
action to be taken from each possible state, but rather an optimal
O-to-D path. This method is dubbed the all-paths method and
can be carried out by the following steps:
1) Find all possible paths, H, from O to D,
2) Evaluate Eh(O;x) for each path h ∈ H using (21),
3) Find the optimal path h∗ which solves:
h∗ = argmin
h∈H
Eh(O;x). (24)
Note that after computing Eh(O;x), and given that
Eh(D;x) = 0, the resulting optimal values at the nodes of h∗
can be computed following (20).
Remark 1: The all-paths method is guaranteed to find a
solution to U ’s problem, given in (23), in |H| = H iterations.
By its definition, the all-paths method searches over all possible
O-to-D paths. Due to the equivalence between a certain policy
and its resulting path in terms of the achieved value at the origin,
searching over all possible paths H, requiring H iterations, will
guarantee obtaining the solution to (23).
The all-paths method can be considered an informed ex-
haustive search method. In fact, rather than searching over all
possible policies, P , whose size can be computed as |P| =∏
n∈N\{D} |Ng(n)| ≥ H , the all-paths method leverages the
policy-path equivalence to search only over the set of possible O-
to-D paths, H. If the security graph, G, can be split into phases
where each two consecutive phases form a complete bipartite
graph12 (as is the case in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), H grows linearly in
the number of nodes, Ni, in a given phase. Indeed, in a phase-
connected graph with A phases, the total number of O-to-D
paths is given by H =
∏A
i=1Ni. For example, in Fig. 2, A = 5
and H = 18 while |P| = 216; the latter is the number of
iterations needed for a standard exhaustive search. Hence, the
all-paths method requires fewer iterations than the exhaustive
search method, and in contrast to policy and value iterations,
each iteration of the all-paths method is search-free (that is, it
12We refer to such graphs as phase-connected graphs. When representing G
by an interconnection of phases, this reflects the case in which the UAV goes
from one set of danger points to the other (for example between sets of hills and
sets of high-rise buildings) with relatively safe conditions in between, which can
provide a practical representation of our studied security setting.
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Fig. 2. Phases-connected security graph with A = 5 phases.
does not require a minimization step) and is only limited to
arithmetic operations which can be efficiently performed.
From the interdictor’s side, after predicting the reaction pi∗x
for a chosen interdiction strategy x ∈ X , I aims at solving the
optimization problem defined in (22). The main challenge with
solving this problem resides in the discontinuous changes in the
objective function which can be induced by a slight modification
to the chosen strategy x. This is due to the fact that a minimal
change to the chosen x can lead to a complete modification of
the resulting optimal reaction MDP policy of U . Hence, due
to the discontinuity of the objective function in (22), finding
an exact globally optimal solution to the interdictor’s problem
may not be guaranteed. The search for such a global optimum
can be done using heuristic methods such as pattern search
based methods [35]. By using pattern search based methods, an
achievable solution to the interdictor’s problem can be obtained
which leads to what we consider an achievable MSE.
V. GAME ANALYSIS UNDER PT
As established in Section III and Section IV, the choices of
interdiction and path selection strategies are carried out under
uncertainty. Indeed, every chosen interdiction strategy and path
selection strategy give rise to a prospect: A set of possible
achievable delivery times each of which can occur with a certain
probability. In fact, when I chooses x and U chooses path
h = (O,n1, n2, n3, ..., nr, nl, nk, nm, D), and if we let kni ∈
N0 be the number of times the UAV is successfully attacked
at node ni ∈ h \ {O,D}, then the possible achieved delivery
times T ′(kn1 , kn2 , ..., knm) and their associated probabilities of
occurrence, τ ′(kn1 , kn2 , ..., knm), will be given by
13
T ′(kn1 , kn2 , ..., knm)=f
h(D)+
m∑
i=1
kni [f
h(ni)+ta] (25)
τ ′(kn1 , kn2 ,..., knm)=
[ m∏
i=1
(1−xnipni)
][
xn1pn1
]kn1[ m∏
j=2
(ξnj )
knj
]
(26)
where
ξnj =
[ j−1∏
r=1
(1− xnrpnr )
]
xnjpnj (27)
The previous analyses in Section III and Section IV had
considered the situation where the uncertainty is managed by I
and U in a fully rational and objective manner. In other words,
the possible delivery times, in (25), and the probabilities of
their occurrence, in (26), are similarly and objectively perceived
13The expressions in (25) and (26) reduce, respectively, to (1) and (2) when
considering pure interdiction.
by I and U , leading the players to assess a pair of strategies
based on an expected value of their resulting prospect. However,
given the time criticality of the studied drone applications (which
must execute certain missions within a target time period), a
certain achieved delivery time can be assessed subjectively and
differently by U and I with respect to their chosen target
delivery times. In addition, the perception of probabilities by
U and I can be distorted, which makes them deviate from
the rational objective perception, leading each player to assess
the risk level of a certain path differently. Indeed, as has been
shown in a number of psychological empirical studies, as in [26]
and [27], when faced with risk and uncertainty (similarly to our
time-critical network interdiction game), the decision making
processes of individuals can significantly deviate from full ratio-
nality. Essentially, individuals have been found to subjectively
evaluate outcomes and perceive probabilities [26], [27], hence
assessing a certain prospect not based on its expected value but
based on a subjective valuation assigned to this prospect.
To capture the interdictor’s and UAV operator’s potential sub-
jective perceptions (i.e. bounded rationality)14, we incorporate
the principles of cumulative prospect theory [26] in our game
formulation. PT is a Nobel prize-winning theory which has
been shown to successfully model and predict decision makers’
subjective behaviors, preferences, and valuations. Indeed, using
PT, the subjective perception of the likelihood of occurrence of
a probabilistic delivery time and the subjective evaluation of this
delivery time with respect to a reference point becomes central to
the decision making processes of I and U . Consider a prospect
g(φi, ηi), listing each possible outcome φi and its probability of
occurrence ηi. Each φi is a possible delivery time T ′ in (25) and
ηi is its corresponding probability, τ ′i , in (26). Under PT, for a
maximizer, the value of an outcome φi, denoted by v(φi), with
respect to a reference point R is given by [26]:
v(φi) =
{
(φi −R)β+ , if φi ≥ R, (28)
−λ(−(φi −R))β− , if φi < R, (29)
where λ is known as the loss multiplier and β+ and β− are
constant parameters which shape the value function. Based on
the sign of v(φi), g can be split into a negative prospect g− and
positive prospect g+. The values in g− correspond to losses and
the values in g+ correspond to gains. Consider that g− contains
m terms, indexed from −m to −1, and g+ contains κ terms,
indexed from 1 to κ. In addition, consider that each of the two
prospects are ranked in ascending order based on the values,
v(φi). Under PT, the valuations of the positive and negative
prospects, V (g+) and V (g−), are given by [26]:
V (g+) =
κ∑
i=1
pi+i v(φi), and V (g
−) =
−1∑
i=−m
pi−i v(φi), (30)
resulting in the valuation, V (g) = V (g+)+V (g−), of prospect g.
pi+i and pi
−
i are decision weights defined based on the cumulative
probability of occurrence of outcome φi:
14Although the proposed game policy will be implemented autonomously by
the drone, the design of the game-theoretic policies are performed by a human
operator whose perceptions are subjective and rationality is bounded.
pi+i =ω
+
( κ∑
j=i
ηi
)
−ω+
( κ∑
j=i+1
ηi
)
, pi−i =ω
−( i∑
j=−m
ηi
)− ω−( i−1∑
j=−m
ηi
)
,
(31)
where ω+ and ω− are the weighting functions associated with
the positive and negative prospects, respectively, and are defined
as follows (for a certain objective probability η) [26]:
ω+(η)=
ηγ
+
(ηγ++(1−η)γ+)1/γ+ , ω
−(η)=
ηγ
−
(ηγ−+(1−η)γ−)1/γ− ,
(32)
where γ+ ∈ (0, 1] and γ− ∈ (0, 1] are known as the rationality
parameters. The higher the value of the rationality parameter, the
closer are ω+(η) and ω−(η) to the rational probability η.
The expressions in (31) showcase the way decision weights
are formed from cumulative probabilities of outcomes in a
prospect. In fact,
∑κ
j=i ηi corresponds to the probability that the
outcome is at least as good as φi while
∑κ
j=i+1 ηi corresponds
to the probability that the outcome is strictly better than φi.
Equivalently,
∑i
j=−m ηi corresponds to the probability that the
outcome is at least as bad as φi while
∑i−1
j=−m corresponds to
the probability that the outcome is strictly worse than φi.
Next, we formulate our network interdiction game under PT,
which we call the PT game. We also split our analysis of the
PT game into pure and mixed interdiction cases. Here, we note
that the notations of the constants used in (28), (29), and (32),
i.e. λ,R, β+, β−, γ+, and γ−, will be consistently used in the
analyses that ensues but will be indexed by I and U depending
on the player to which they refer.
A. PT Game under Pure Interdiction Strategies
As discussed in Section III-A, when U chooses path h and
I is located on node n ∈ h, the possible outcomes, Tk, and
their associated probability of occurrence, τk, for k ∈ N0, are as
described, respectively, in (1) and (2). Hence, the (n, h) strategy
pair gives rise to a prospect, g(n ∈ h), in which the outcomes
are ordered from lowest to highest, and is expressed as:
g(n ∈ h) =(fh(D), qn; fh(D) + (fh(n) + ta), pnqn;
. . . ; fh(D) + k(fh(n) + ta), (pn)
kqn; . . .
)
.
(33)
As PT predicts, the interdictor and the UAV operator evaluate
each possible outcome of this prospect subjectively, as shown
in (28) and (29). In this regard, the valuation, vIk, that the
interdictor gives to the kth possible outcome, Tk = fh(D) +
k(fh(n) + ta), is as follows:
vIk=
{
(∆Ik)
β+I , if ∆Ik≥0, (34)
−λI(−(∆Ik))β
−
I , if ∆Ik<0, (35)
where
∆Ik = f
h(D) + k(fh(n) + ta)−RI . (36)
Given that the interdictor aims at maximizing the expected
delivery time, ∆Ik ≥ 0 is seen as a gain while ∆Ik < 0 is
seen as a loss. Equivalently, the valuation, vUk , that the UAV
operator gives to the kth possible outcome, Tk, is as follows:
vUk =
{
λU (∆Uk)
β−U , if ∆Uk>0, (37)
−(−(∆Uk))β
+
U , if ∆Uk≤0, (38)
where
∆Uk = f
h(D) + k(fh(n) + ta)−RU . (39)
Since U aims at minimizing the expected delivery time, ∆Uk >
0 is evaluated as a loss while ∆Uk ≤ 0 is viewed as a gain.
Using PT principles, we derive the valuations that I and U
assign to each possible choice of the pair of pure interdiction
and path selection strategies (n, h). We denote these valuations
by VI(n, h) and VU (n, h) for, respectively, I and U .
Theorem 2: The cumulative prospect-theoretic valuation that
I assigns to a strategy pair (n, h) is given by
VI(n, h) =
{
VI(gI(n /∈ h)), if n /∈ h, (40)
VI(gI(n ∈ h)), if n ∈ h, (41)
where
VI(gI(n /∈h))=
{
(fh(D)−RI)β
+
I , if fh(D) ≥ RI ,
−λI(−(fh(D)−RI))β
−
I, if fh(D)<RI , (42)
VI(gI(n ∈ h))=
k−I∑
i=0
−λI(−∆Ii)β
−
i
(
ω−I
(
1−pi+1n
)−ω−I (1−pin))
+
∞∑
i=k+I
(∆Ii)
β+I
[
ω+I
(
(pn)
i
)−ω+I ((pn)i+1)], (43)
where k−I and k
+
I are such that: ∆Ik < 0 for k ≤ k−I , ∆Ik > 0,
for k > k+I , and k
+
I = k
−
I + 1;
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix B.
Theorem 3: The cumulative prospect-theoretic valuation that
U assigns to a strategy pair (n, h) is given by
VU (n, h) =
{
VU (gU (n /∈ h)), if n /∈ h, (44)
VU (gU (n ∈ h)), if n ∈ h, (45)
where
VU (gU (n /∈h))=
{
−(−(fh(D)−RU ))β
+
U , if fh(D)≤RU ,
λU (f
h(D)−RU )β
−
U , if fh(D) > RU , (46)
and
VU (gU (n ∈ h))=
k−U∑
i=0
−(−∆Ui)β
+
U
(
ω+U (1−pi+1n )−ω+U (1−pin)
)
+
∞∑
i=k+U
λU (∆Ui)
β−U
(
ω−U
(
(pn)
i
)−ω−U (p(i+1)n )),
(47)
where k−U and k
+
U are such that: ∆Uk < 0 for k ≤ k−U , ∆Uk > 0
for k ≥ k+U , and k+U = k−U + 1.
Proof: This proof follows steps similar to those in the proof
of Theorem 2 while accounting for the valuations that U assigns
to each possible outcome given in (37)-(39).
As shown in (43) and (47), VI(gI(n ∈ h)) and VU (gU (n ∈ h))
correspond to infinite summations, i.e. infinite series. Hence, to
be able to compare between possible pairs of strategies (n, h),
based on their valuations VI(n, h) and VU (n, h), and to identify
the equilibrium strategy pair, it is necessary for these sums to
converge. We next show in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 that
VI(gI(n ∈ h)) and VU (gU (n ∈ h)) are convergent series.
Proposition 3: VI(gI(n ∈ h)) is a convergent series.
Proof: Toward proving the convergence of VI(gI(n ∈ h)),
we first prove that VI(g+I (n ∈ h)), defined in (64) and com-
posed of positive terms, converges using what is known as
the ratio test. Following the ratio test, for a series
∑∞
n=1 an
with positive terms an, L is defined as L = lim
n→∞|
an+1
an
|.
If L < 1, then
∑∞
n=1 an converges. As such, we refer to
the kth term of VI(g+I (n ∈ h)) by V I
+
k , which is given by
V I
+
k = (∆Ik)
β+I
[
ω+I
(
(pn)
k
)−ω+I ((pn)k+1)], while ω+I (pkn)
follows from (32). In this respect,
L= lim
k→∞
V I
+
k+1
V I
+
k
=
p
(k+1)γ+I
n −p(k+2)γ
+
I
n
p
kγ+I
n −p(k+1)γ
+
I
n
=
p
γ+I
n −p2γ
+
I
n
1−pγ
+
I
n
=p
γ+I
n < 1
⇒ VI(g+I (n ∈ h)) converges ⇒ VI(gI(n ∈ h)) converges.
Proposition 4: VU (gU (n ∈ h)) is a convergent series.
Proof: The proof follows steps similar to those in the proof
of Proposition 3.
Under PT, the pure-strategy equilibrium of the game is based
on the subjective valuations, VI(n, h) and VU (n, h), that I and
U respectively assign to the prospect resulting from the choice
of strategy pair (n, h). As such, under PT, the game becomes a
nonzero-sum game whose SE is analyzed next.
As in the analysis in Section III-B, U can optimally react to a
decision n that had been taken by I . However, for the PT game,
this optimal reaction is based on the valuation VU (n, h) rather
than the expected delivery time Ed(n, h). In this PT game, we
denote the choice of a path h ∈ H by U , as an optimal reaction
to a node n ∈ N that had been chosen by I , by ρPT(n), which
is formally defined as:
ρPT(n) = argmin
h∈H
VU (n, h), (48)
where VU (n, h) is as given in Theorem 3.
Paralleling the SE for the fully rational game in Definition 1,
an SE for the PT game (SE-PT) is defined as follows.
Definition 3: A strategy pair (n˜∗, h˜∗) constitutes a Stackelberg
equilibrium of the PT game if
VI(n˜
∗, h˜∗ = ρPT(n˜∗)) ≥ VI(n, ρPT(n)) ∀n ∈ N , (49)
where VI(n, h) is as defined in Theorem 2, and ρPT(n) is as
defined in (48).
I’s problem corresponds, then, to choosing n˜∗ which solves
n˜∗ = argmax
n∈N
VI(n, ρ
PT(n)). (50)
Following a similar logic as in the derivation of the SE in
Theorem 1, the SE-PT can be analytically characterized.
Theorem 4: The interdictor’s SE-PT strategy, n˜∗, is given by:
n˜∗ = argmax
n∈{m1,m2}
(
VI(m1, ρ
PT(m1)), VI(m2, ρ
PT(m2))
)
, (51)
where m1 = argmax
n∈Mhs
VI(gI(n ∈ hs)), (52)
Mhs = {n ∈ hs|VU (gU (n ∈ hs)) ≤ VU (gU (n /∈ hn))}, (53)
hn is the shortest O-to-D path not containing node n, and
m2 = argmax
n∈hs\Mhs
VI(gI(n /∈ hn)). (54)
The resulting UAV operator’s SE-PT strategy is given by
h˜∗=ρPT(n˜∗)=
{
hs, if n˜∗ = m1, (55)
hm2 , if n˜
∗ = m2. (56)
Proof: Due to space limitations, only a sketch of the proof
is provided. U ’s response to a choice n ∈ hs by I will either be
hs or hn. I always has an incentive to choose n ∈ hs, since
otherwise, ρPT(n) = hs, which results in the worst possible
VI(n, h) for I . However, choosing an n ∈ hs might also lead U
to deviate from hs to the best alternative hn. Hence, I can split
the nodes in hs into two sets, Mhs and N \Mhs , where the
former set consists of nodes of hs which when attacked would
not lead U to deviate from hs, while the latter set consists of
nodes which when attacked will lead to deviations to the best
alternative. Hence, m1 and m2 in (52) and (54) represent the
best two alternatives for I . As such, n˜∗ in (51) corresponds
to choosing the best of these two alternatives, and h˜∗ in (55)
and (56) correspond to choosing the best reaction ρPT by U to
the choice made by I .
Theorem 4 analytically characterizes the SE of the PT game,
which can be compared to the SE of the game with full rationality
derived in Theorem 1. This comparison enables us to analyze the
effect of the players’ subjective PT valuations and perceptions on
their chosen equilibrium strategies. Indeed, a main component of
the choice of the SE and SE-PT strategies is the characterization
of sets Nhs , in (10), and Mhs , in (53). By comparing (10)
and (53), we can see that Ns relies on the comparison between
pn
1−pn (f
hs(n) + ta) + f
hs(D) and fhn(D) for each n ∈ hs;
while Mhs relies on comparing VU (gU (n ∈ hs)), which can
be obtained from (47), with VU (gU (n /∈ hn)), which can be
obtained from (46). Hence, this difference in Nhs and Mhs
enables possible deviation of the SE-PT strategies from the SE
strategies.
Next, we formulate, analyze, and characterize equilibrium so-
lutions to the PT game considering mixed interdiction strategies.
B. PT Game under Mixed-Strategy Interdiction
Consider the case where I chooses x and U chooses a
policy that induces path h = (O, n1, n2, n3, ..., nr, nl, nk,
nm, D). Then, the resulting possible delivery times, T ′(kn1 ,
kn2 , ..., knm), and their associated probabilities of occurrence,
τ ′(kn1 , kn2 , ..., knm), are given by (25) and (26), where kni ∈
N0 is the number of times the UAV is successfully attacked
at a node ni ∈ h \ {O,D}. Hence, the interdiction strategy
x, by I , and response path h, by U , result in a prospect
Γ(x, h) in which each outcome T ′(kn1 , kn2 ..., knm) occurs with
probability τ ′(kn1 , kn2 ..., knm). Under PT, to compare strategy
pairs (x, h) ∈ X × H, each of I and U generates a personal
valuation of this prospect. As a result, their choices of optimal
mixed interdiction and path selection strategies are based on
these PT valuations. Given (25)-(27) and the value and weighting
functions introduced in (28)-(32), we can generate the valuations
assigned by I and U , ΞI(x, h) and ΞU (x, h), to prospect Γ(x, h)
by following steps similar to those in Section V-A. Based on
ΞI(x, h) and ΞU (x, h), the equilibrium of the PT game with
mixed interdiction strategies can be characterized.
In this regard, the definition of the SE-PT equilibrium in-
troduced in Definition 3 can be extended to the mixed-strategy
interdiction case as follows:
Definition 4: A strategy pair (x˜∗, h˜∗x˜∗) constitutes a PT mixed-
strategy interdiction Stackelberg equilibrium (MSE-PT) of the
network interdiction game if
ΞI(x˜
∗, h˜∗x˜∗ = ρ˜
PT(x˜∗)) ≥ ΞI(x, ρ˜PT(x)) for all n ∈ N , (57)
where ρ˜PT(x) is the optimal reaction of U to x and is given by:
ρ˜PT(x) = argmin
h∈H
ΞU (x, h). (58)
Our solution approach presented in Section IV-B, which
delivered the MSE of the game (under full rationality), also
applies here to derive the MSE-PT of the PT game. Indeed,
characterizing the MSE-PT requires solving U ’s problem in (58)
as well as I’s problem given in (57). The all-paths method
proposed in Section IV-B can guarantee solving U ’s problem.
Remark 2: The all-paths method is guaranteed to find ρ˜(x)
for each interdiction strategy x ∈ X . Finding ρ˜(x) corresponds
to identifying the path h obtained as h = argmin
h∈H
ΞU (x, h). As
such, by following steps 1 to 3 of the all-paths method, and
considering ΞU (x, h) instead of Eh(O;x), the all-paths method
performs a complete search over all possible O-to-D paths and
returns path h which results in the minimum ΞU (x, h), hence,
determining ρ˜(x).
The interdictor’s problem corresponds to solving the following
optimization problem:
x˜∗ = argmax
x∈X
ΞI(x, ρ˜
PT(x)). (59)
As in I’s problem in Section IV, obtaining an exact global
solution to (59) cannot be guaranteed due to the non-convexity
and discontinuity of the objective function stemming from the
sudden changes to ρ˜PT(x) which can be triggered by minimal
changes to x. Hence, for obtaining a solution to (59), we
propose using a pattern search based method, as discussed in
Section IV-B.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For the numerical analyses, we consider the graph shown in
Fig. 1 composed of N = 10 nodes and E = 18 edges. We
label the 18 paths, from 1 to 18, as follows: [1, 2, ..., 18] ,
[(2, 5, 7), (2, 5, 8), (2, 5, 9), (2, 6, 7), (2, 6, 8), (2, 6, 9), (3, 5, 7),
(3, 5, 8), (3, 5, 9), (3, 6, 7), (3, 6, 8), (3, 6, 9), (4, 5, 7), (4, 5, 8),
(4, 5, 9), (4, 6, 7), (4, 6, 8), (4, 6, 9)]. Given that node 1 (O) and
node 10 (D) are part of each path, a path (1, i, j, k, 10) is,
for convenience, referred to by (i, j, k). In addition, the travel
times ti, for i ∈ {1, ..., 18}, in Fig. 1 are drawn from a uniform
distribution in the interval [2, 8] yielding [t1, t2, ..., t18] , [6.89,
3.46, 7.58, 4.1, 3.18, 3.51, 5.7, 4.84, 4.11, 6.99, 5.51, 5.3, 7.5,
3.72, 6.54, 6.52, 4.28, 5.41]. We then choose the attack success
probabilities as p= [0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.4, 0.6, 0.3, 0.4, 0.8, 0.4,
0]. The length of each path h, fh(D), and the risk probability
at each node, pn, are shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 shows that path
8, i.e. (3, 5, 8), is the shortest path followed by paths 11, i.e.
(3, 6, 8), and path 9, (3, 5, 9); while node 8 is the most risky
node followed by nodes 5 and 3, respectively. The re-handling
and processing time is considered to be ta = 5. For the PT
parameters of I and U , unless stated otherwise, we consider
RI = RU = 20, λI = λU = 2.5, β−I = β
+
I = β
−
U = β
+
U = 0.6,
and γ−I = γ
+
I = γ
−
U = γ
+
U = 0.5.
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Fig. 3. Paths lengths, fh(D), and node risk probabilities, pn.
We will first take the reference points (which represent, for
example, a target delivery time) of both players to be equal, RI =
RU = R, and ranging from 10 to 35. The resulting equilibrium
interdiction strategies (i.e. I’s equilibrium strategies) are shown
in Fig. 4, and U ’s equilibrium strategies are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 4 shows that the MSE interdiction strategy, x∗, focuses
solely on nodes 5, 8, and 9, (x∗5 = 0.48, x
∗
8 = 0.31, and x
∗
9 =
0.21) each of which is at least part of one of the three shortest
paths (paths 8, 11, and 9). In addition, U ’s MSE strategy, h∗,
corresponds to choosing path 12, which is composed of nodes
3, 6, and 9. Given that nodes 3 and 6 are not attacked by I at
the MSE and that p9 = 0.4 and x∗9 = 0.2, path 12 is a relatively
safe path. The players’ MSE strategies lead to an MSE expected
delivery time that is equal to around 23, as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 4 shows the difference between I’s MSE-PT interdiction
strategies, x˜∗, and the MSE interdiction strategies for different
values of R. Fig. 4 shows the shift in the PT interdiction strategy,
x˜∗, from mainly targeting the incoming neighbor nodes of D (i.e.
nodes 7, 8, and 9), at R = 10, to a more spread out interdiction
strategy targeting a larger number of nodes, at R = 35. At
small values of R, such as R = 10, all possible delivery times
fall above R. Hence, all possible outcomes are valued by I
as gains. Since the PT value function, vI(.) in (28) and (29),
leads I to be risk averse in gains, choosing nodes 7, 8, and 9
is appealing since any O-to-D path is guaranteed to pass by at
least one of these nodes. Clearly, this choice of x˜∗ is a risk
averse choice that guarantees a sure gain. However, when R
increases, some of the possible delivery times will fall below R.
Hence, for a choice x by I , and h by U , some of the outcomes
will correspond to gains and some to losses leading I to drift
away from a mere risk averse strategy. In Fig. 5, we show the
different MSE-PT strategies of U as R varies. Fig. 5 shows that
at R = 10, U chooses the shortest path 8 at the MSE-PT. This is
due to the fact that, for this small reference point R, all possible
delivery times are seen as losses by U . The concavity of the
value function for outcomes greater than RU renders U risk
seeking in losses. Hence, taking the shortest path (even if it
is risky up to a certain extent) becomes more appealing to U .
When R increases, U ’s MSE-PT strategy will drift away from the
shortest path, particularly at values of R that are high enough to
enable certain possible delivery times to fall below the reference
delivery time, R, leading to outcomes that are valued as gains.
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium interdiction strategy for different R = RI = RU .
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Fig. 5. U ’s equilibrium path selection strategy for different R = RI = RU .
Fig. 6 shows the resulting expected delivery times, at the MSE
and MSE-PT, for the different values of R. Clearly, for low
values of R, the MSE-PT results in a lower expected delivery
time than the MSE. However, for relatively high values of R,
the MSE-PT results in an expected delivery time that is higher
than the expected delivery time at the MSE. As shown in Fig. 6,
the percentage difference in expected delivery time at the MSE-
PT compared to the MSE is −7.5% at R = 15 and +14.4%
at R = 30. Indeed, since at low values of R, I takes a risk
averse non-aggressive attack strategy, as shown in Fig. 4, and
U chooses a risk-seeking shortest path, as shown in Fig. 5, this
leads to achieving a relatively short expected delivery time since
this shortest path (i.e. path 8) is not heavily targeted by I at the
MSE-PT. However, for higher values of R, I considers more
aggressive interdiction strategies and U considers safer paths
which results in expected delivery times that are higher at the
MSE-PT than at the MSE. In addition, the results in Fig. 6
show that at the MSE-PT, except for R = 30 and R = 35,
U was not able to achieve an expected delivery time that is
below its target reference delivery time. However, at the MSE,
U ’s expected delivery time is lower than its target delivery time
for R ≥ 25. Hence, selecting strategies based on PT valuations
is, based on this comparison, disadvantageous to U .
Hereinafter, to characterize the effect of the various PT pa-
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Fig. 6. Expected delivery time for different R = RI = RU .
rameters on the resulting equilibrium strategies and outcomes,
we consider the interdictor to be fully rational (i.e. RI = 0,
λI = 1, β−I = β
+
I = 1, and γ
−
I = γ
+
I = 1), while U
values outcomes and performs probability weighting following
PT, with PT parameters similar to the ones used in the previous
simulations, unless stated otherwise. We first study the effect of
varying the rationality parameters of U , i.e. γ−U and γ
+
U , on the
MSE-PT and then study the effects of varying U ’s loss parameter
λU . First, we consider γU = γ−U = γ
+
U , and we let γU take the
following values: 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9.
Fig. 7 shows that the MSE-PT interdiction strategy approaches
its MSE strategy at higher values of γU . However, one can
see that I’s MSE-PT strategy does not completely coincide
with its MSE even for high values of γU . This is due to the
fact that even when U ’s probability weighting is closer to full
rationality, the way U values the possible game outcomes (i.e. the
possible delivery times) is based on its reference point RU and
value function. Hence, even with a closely rational probability
weighting, U ’s MSE-PT may not equal its MSE strategy. This
can, indeed, be seen from Fig. 8, which shows that even for
γU = 0.9, U ’s MSE-PT strategy is different from its MSE
strategy. Fig. 8 shows how U ’s MSE-PT strategy changes with
an increase in γU . At lower values of γU , U ’s MSE-PT strategy
consists of path 9, i.e. (3, 5, 9), while at higher values of γU ,
U ’s MSE-PT strategy shifts to choosing path 11, i.e (3, 6, 8).
As shown in Fig. 7, at lower values of γU , I’s optimal strategy
is focused on nodes 5 and 8 making path 9, chosen by U at
the MSE-PT, highly risky. However, U still chooses this path, at
the MSE-PT, since at such low values of γU , U ’s valuation of
probabilities is highly distorted. In fact, the weighting functions
ω+U (.) and ω
−
U (.) flatten for lower values of γU . Hence, U
would assess different paths as almost equally risky leading U
to choose path 9. However, when γU increases, U ’s perception
of probabilities becomes more rational. Hence, for these values
of γU , U can observe that path 9 is highly risky and chooses
instead the safer path 11, composed of nodes (3, 6, 8) which are
not attacked with a high probability by I at the MSE-PT.
Fig. 9 shows the resulting expected delivery times at the MSE
and at the MSE-PT for various values of γU . From Fig. 9, we can
see that the MSE-PT strategies result in expected delivery times
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that are longer than the expected delivery time achieved at the
MSE. Indeed, for γU = 0.25, the percentage difference between
the expected delivery time at the MSE-PT and that at the MSE
goes up to +21.5%. The reason is that, as shown in Fig. 8, for
low values of γU , U admits a risky MSE-PT strategy leading to
high expected delivery times. However, as γU increases, the shift
in U ’s MSE-PT strategy allows achieving better expected deliv-
ery times; which are, however, still longer than the MSE expected
delivery time. Fig. 9 also shows an expected delivery time labeled
“Rational response”. This corresponds to U choosing a rational
strategy in response to I’s MSE-PT strategy. In other words,
rational response corresponds to choosing the path strategy h∗
which solves (24) for x = x˜∗. In this scenario, I assumes that
U admits PT valuations and would, hence, choose its MSE-
PT strategy, x˜∗. However, if U is rather rational, it can take
advantage of its knowledge of x˜∗ to achieve a better expected
delivery time. Indeed, the rational response of U consists of
choosing path 11, for γU = 0.25 and γU = 0.3, and path 12,
for the higher values of γU , which result in achieving expected
delivery times that are shorter than the expected delivery times at
the MSE-PT and the MSE, as shown in Fig. 9. In fact, as can be
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Fig. 9. Expected delivery time a) when U plays a rational response to I’s
MSE-PT strategy, b) at the MSE, and c) at the MSE-PT for different values of
γU = γ
−
U = γ
+
U .
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Fig. 10. Expected delivery time a) when U plays a rational response to I’s
MSE-PT strategy, b) at the MSE, and c) at the MSE-PT, for different λU .
seen from Fig. 9, at γU = 0.25, choosing the rational response
strategy (which corresponds to choosing path 11) allows U to
achieve an expected delivery time that is 30.3% lower than the
expected delivery time achieved at the MSE-PT.
Fig. 10 shows the resulting expected delivery times at the MSE
and at the MSE-PT, for the various values of λU ∈ {1, 2.5, 5}.
Fig. 10 also shows the expected delivery time achieved when U
plays the rational response strategy as a reaction to I choosing
its MSE-PT strategy. Fig. 10 shows that the MSE-PT strategies
chosen at different values of λU result in an expected delivery
time that is only slightly higher than the one achieved at the
MSE. At higher values of λU , this difference in expected delivery
times decreases. Indeed, at λU = 1, the percentage difference
between the MSE-PT and the MSE expected delivery times is
+4.14% while this difference drops to only 1.3% at λU = 5.
However, when U plays a rational response strategy, in response
to I’s MSE-PT strategy (which consists of choosing path 12 for
all the three values of λU , i.e. 1, 2.5 and 5), U can achieve an
expected delivery time that is up to 11% lower than the expected
delivery time achieved at the MSE.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a novel mathematical frame-
work for studying the cyber-physical security of time-critical
UAV applications, such as drone delivery systems and anti-
drone systems. We have provided a formulation of the problem
using the framework of a network interdiction game between
the UAV operator and the interdictor, while viewing either of
them as malicious and the other one as benign. In addition, we
have incorporated principles from cumulative prospect theory
in the game formulation to account for the players’ potential
subjectivity and bounded rationality. We have characterized
Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of the various types of
games and studied their properties. Simulation results have
shown that the subjectivity of the players can lead to delays in
the expected delivery time which can surpass the target delivery
time predefined by the UAV operator.
This work paves the way for various future research steps.
Indeed, the introduced time-critical network interdiction game
can be studied in the presence of multiple UAVs and multiple
adversaries as well as considering dynamically changing security
graphs. In addition, the introduced time-critical model can be
leveraged beyond the analysis of UAVs, by focusing on any
autonomous system performing a time-critical mission. Each
studied application yields different types of security graphs over
which the game can be formulated and analyzed.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We first prove that choosing a node n /∈ hs is a
dominated strategy for the interdictor. In fact, If n /∈ hs ⇒
ρ(n) = hs ⇒ Ed(n /∈ hs, ρ(n))=fhs(D) ≤ Ed(n, ρ(n)) ∀n ∈
N , since fhs(D) is the shortest possible expected delivery time.
Hence, the interdictor should always choose a node n that is part
of a shortest O-to-D path, hs.
Now, based on (3) and (4), for n ∈ hs,
ρ(n)=
{
hs, if
pn
1−pn (f
hs(n)+ta)+f
hs(D)≤fhn(D), (60)
hn, otherwise, (61)
where condition (60) reflects that, even when the interdictor is
located at n ∈ hs, the shortest path, hs, results in a shorter ex-
pected delivery time than the best alternative, i.e., hn. When this
condition is not met, a deviation from hs to the best alternative,
hn, leads to a shorter expected delivery time as captured in (61).
In this respect, we let Nhs denote the set of nodes that are part of
hs but are such that pn1−pn (f
hs(n)+ta)+f
hs(D)≤fhn(D). Nhs
is formally defined in (10). Hence, the two possible alternatives
for the optimal choice of I are n1 and n2 defined as:
n1 = argmax
n∈Nhs
[ pn
1− pn (f
hs(n) + ta) + f
hs(D)
]
,
and
n2 = argmax
n∈hs\Nhs
fhn(D),
which result, respectively, in expected delivery times:
Ed(n1, ρ(n1) = hs) =
pn1
1− pn1
(fhs(n1) + ta) + f
hs(D),
Ed(n2, ρ(n2) = hn2) = f
hn2 (D).
The interdictor’s SE strategy consists, hence, of choosing the
best of the two alternatives, n1 and n2:
n∗ = argmax
n∈{n1,n2}
(
Ed
(
n1, ρ(n1)
)
, Ed
(
n2, ρ(n2)
))
,
which will result in SE strategies for U and expected delivery
times as stated in (11)-(14).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We start by considering the case in which n ∈ h. In
this case, incorporating I’s valuation of each possible outcome,
based on (34)-(36), in prospect g(n ∈ h), leads to the following
prospect, gI(n ∈ h):
gI(n ∈ h)=
(
−λI(−∆I0)β
−
I , qn;−λI(−∆I1)β
−
I , (pn)qn; . . . ;
−λI(−∆Ik−I )
β−I , (pn)
k−I qn; (∆Ik+I
)β
+
I , (pn)
k+I qn; . . .
)
,
such that ∆Ik < 0, for k ≤ k−I , and ∆Ik > 0, for k > k+I ;
while ∆Ik is as defined in (36) for k∈{0, 1, ..., k−I , k+I , ...,∞}.
gI(n ∈ h) can be further split into a negative prospect, g−I (n ∈
h), which includes the elements of gI(n ∈ h) with ∆Ik < 0 (i.e.
for k ∈ {0, ..., k−I }), and a positive prospect, g+I (n ∈ h), which
includes the elements of gI(n ∈ h) with ∆Ik > 0 (i.e. for k ≥
k+I ). The negative and positive prospects include, respectively,
the outcomes that I values as losses and outcomes that I values
as gains. g−I (n ∈ h) and g+I (n ∈ h) are expressed as:
g−I (n ∈ h)=
(
−λI(−∆I0)β
−
I , qn; . . . ;−λI(−∆Ik−
I
)β
−
I , (pn)
k−
I qn
)
,
g+I (n ∈ h)=
(
(∆I
k+
I
)β
+
I , (pn)
k+
I qn; . . . ; (∆IkI )
β+
I , (pn)
kI qn; . . .
)
.
We next consider the way I values this prospect by incorpo-
rating not only its subjective valuation of outcomes but also its
cumulative weighting of the probability of occurrence of each
of these outcomes. We let VI(gI(n ∈ h)) denote the PT value
that I gives to prospect gI(n ∈ h), which results from the PT
valuation of the negative and positive components of gI(n ∈ h),
VI(gI(n ∈ h)) = VI(g−I (n ∈ h)) + VI(g+I (n ∈ h)). (62)
VI(g
−
I (n∈h))=−
[
λI(−∆I0)β
−
I
][
ω−I (qn)
]
−
[
λI(−∆I1)β
−
I
][
ω−I
(
qn+pnqn
)
−ω−I (qn)
]
−...−
[
λI(−∆Ik−
I
)β
−
I
][
ω−I
( k−I∑
i=0
qn(pn)
i
)−ω−I ( k
−
I
−1∑
i=0
qn(pn)
i
)]
,
where ∆Ii is as defined in (36) for i ∈ {0, 1, ..., k−I }. Hence,
VI(g
−
I (n∈h))=
k−
I∑
i=0
[
−λI
(
(−∆Ii)β
−
i
)(
ω−I
( i∑
j=0
qn(pn)
j
)−ω−I (i−1∑
j=0
qn(pn)
j
))]
.
However, based on geometric series,
∑i
j=0 qn(pn)
j = 1 −
pi+1n . Then,
VI(g
−
I (n ∈ h))=
k−I∑
i=0
−λI(−∆Ii)β
−
i
(
ω−I
(
1−pi+1n
)
−ω−I
(
1−pin
))
.
(63)
A similar analysis can be carried out to obtain the expression
of VI(g+I (n ∈ h)). In this regard,
VI(g
+
I (n∈h))=
[
(∆I
k+
I
)β
+
I
][
ω+I
( ∞∑
i=k+
I
(pn)
iqn
)−ω+I ( ∞∑
i=k+
I
+1
(pn)
iqn
)]
+...+
[
(∆IkI )
β+
I
][
ω+I
( ∞∑
i=kI
(pn)
iqn
)−ω+I ( ∞∑
i=kI+1
(pn)
iqn
)]
+...
=
∞∑
i=k+
I
(∆Ii)
β+
I
[
ω+I
( ∞∑
j=i
(pn)
jqn
)− ω+I ( ∞∑
j=i+1
(pn)
jqn
)]
.
In addition, based on geometric series,
∑∞
j=i(pn)
jqn
=qn
(∑∞
j=0(pn)
j−∑i−1j=0(pn)j) = pin which results in
VI(g
+
I (n ∈ h))=
∞∑
i=k+I
(∆Ii)
β+I
[
ω+I
(
(pn)
i
)
−ω+I
(
(pn)
i+1
)]
. (64)
Hence, based on (62), (63), and (64),
VI(gI(n ∈ h))=
k−
I∑
i=0
−λI(−∆Ii)β
−
i
(
ω−I
(
1−pi+1n
)−ω−I (1−pin))
+
∞∑
i=k+
I
(∆Ii)
β+
I
[
ω+I
(
(pn)
i)−ω+I ((pn)i+1)],
where k+I = k
−
I + 1.
Next, we consider the case of n /∈ h. When the chosen path h
does not include the interdiction node n, the resulting delivery
time does not result in a probabilistic prospect but is rather
deterministic and equal to fh(D) with a probability equal to
1, i.e., g(n /∈ h) = (fh(D), 1). As such, g(n /∈ h) is valued by
I depending on whether fh(D) is higher or lower than RI (i.e.
a gain or a loss scenario). Hence, the value, VI(gI(n /∈ h)), that
I associates to prospect gI(n /∈ h), is:
VI(gI(n /∈h))=
{
(fh(D)−RI)β
+
I , if fh(D) ≥ RI ;
−λI(−(fh(D)−RI))β
−
I , if fh(D)<RI .
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